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The theoretical foundations and 
continued rationale for source-based 




This paper is directed at analysing the theoretical foundations and rationale for 
source-based taxation1 and argues that these principles remain valid despite changes 
brought about by globalisation, including the increased incidence of transactions that 
occur via electronic commerce. The analysis in this paper is not concerned with how 
source is defined,2 but rather at establishing that source-based taxation continues 
to be theoretically justifiable for income that arises from international transactions 
which are conducted in a globalised business environment, including those that occur 
through the agency of electronic commerce. 
* This paper draws from the author’s doctoral work which was published by the IBFD in its Doctoral 
Series.  See Dale Pinto, E-Commerce and Source-Based Income Taxation (IBFD, 2003).
** Professor of Taxation Law, Curtin University, Western Australia.
1  Most countries that impose an income tax rely on two jurisdictional bases–the taxpayer’s 
personal connections to a country (residence-based taxation) and the geographical source 
of income (source-based taxation): Brian J Arnold, ‘Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, 
Harmful Tax Competition, and International Taxation’ in Canadian Tax Foundation (ed), 2000 
World Tax Conference Report (2000) 17:1. Both residence and source-based taxation can be 
justified in terms of tax policy principles, though this paper is concerned with the theoretical 
justification for source-based taxation and its application to electronic commerce transactions.
2 For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, the country where a business is based or established 
will be regarded as the residence country, while the foreign country where this business is 
conducted will be regarded as the country of source. 
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I The Theoretical Basis for Source-Based Taxation 
and Its Application to Electronic Commerce
A.	 Benefit	Theory	
Vogel notes that two competing theories have consistently influenced the reasoning 
regarding a country’s right of taxation – the benefit theory and the sacrifice theory.3 
Under the benefit theory, a jurisdiction’s right to tax rests on the totality of benefits and 
state services provided to taxpayers that interact with a country. Under the sacrifice 
theory, taxes are viewed as a sacrifice owed to a country due to the higher moral value 
of community purposes over individual aims. Vogel notes that only the benefit theory 
seems acceptable today and therefore the remaining analysis and discussion will be 
made in this context.4
As noted above, under the benefit theory, taxes are regarded as the price paid for all 
state services by all taxpayers taken together, and countries obtain their jurisdiction 
to tax based on the services (benefits) provided. McLure’s observations on the benefit 
principle accords with this view: ‘the country where income originates should be 
compensated for the cost of providing public services.’5 Similar sentiments regarding 
the benefit principle have been expressed much earlier by Thomas S Adams when 
he observed, ‘A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the necessity of 
maintaining a suitable business environment.’6 In a broad sense, these costs may be 
thought of as representing the price of providing a civilised society, thereby justifying 
the imposition of taxes as compensation to the governments bearing them.
Arthur Harding, in a book on double taxation, developed a similar theory regarding 
his theory for source-based taxation.7 Harding argued that economic production 
resulted not just out of the actions of isolated individuals, but as a result of the 
interaction between these individuals and the State:
3 Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-evaluation of 
Arguments (Part III)’ (1998) 11 Intertax 393, 394 (‘Vogel–Part III’). 
4 The arguments relating to the non-acceptance of the sacrifice theory are not centrally relevant 
to the present discussion (which is concerned with benefit theory) and are therefore not further 
considered. The details of these arguments can be found in the writings of Vogel: Ibid 394-5.
5 Charles E McLure Jr, ‘Source-Based Taxation and Alternatives to the Concept of Permanent 
Establishment’ in Canadian Tax Foundation (ed), 2000 World Tax Conference Report (2000) 6:4.
6 Thomas S Adams, ‘The Taxation of Business’ in Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Conference on 
Taxation, National Tax Association (1917) 185-94, at 186, cited in Michael J Graetz and Michael 
M O’Hear, ‘The “Original Intent” of US International Taxation’ (1997) 46 Duke Law Journal 
1021, 1036.
7 Arthur Harding, Double Taxation of Property and Income, A Study in the Judicial Delimitation 
of the Conflicting Claims of Taxing Jurisdiction Advanced by the American States (1933), cited 
in Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-evaluation of 
Arguments (Part I)’ (1988) 8-9 Intertax 216, 220 (‘Vogel–Part I’).
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We see that the economic existence, nature and function of the State is to be found in 
this economic mechanism functioning within its territorial limits and contributing to 
the life, progress and happiness of the individual members of the group and, of necessity, 
of the group as a whole.8
Harding then developed his theory regarding a country’s right to tax that is reminiscent 
of the benefit principle:
It appears that the State may tax all property, goods, labor, services and the like, which 
have become identified with the economic structure of the State, by incorporation into 
or integration with the business mechanism so defined … the right to tax then depends 
upon the fact that the economic wealth is being used in the coordinated economic task 
of the social group; that it is producing utility or wealth or service in connection with, as 
a part of, and because of the economic solidarity of the social group.9
Benefits that may be provided by source countries can either be general or specific. 
In terms of general benefits, education (which relates to the availability and level of 
labour), police, fire and defence protection represent obvious examples. However, 
apart from these general benefits, there are more specific benefits that source countries 
may provide, including a conducive and operational legal infrastructure for the proper 
functioning of business. Allied with this may be specific government policies, such 
as keeping exchange rates stable and interest rates low, thereby providing economic 
stability and business and consumer confidence.10 Most of these general and specific 
benefits would be equally (if not more) relevant in an electronic commerce context – 
this will be explored in more detail when the applicability of the benefit theory in an 
electronic commerce context is analysed.
Source-country taxation is consistent with the benefit theory. Vogel has argued that 
as it is usually the country of source that has provided most or all of the benefits 
relevant for the production of income and therefore incurred costs in providing these 
benefits, exclusive taxation should occur in the source country as compensation to 
the government bearing them.11 Georg von Schanz based his views of international 
income on quite similar views.12 Schanz has showed that both the country of residence 
and the source country can justify a tax claim on the grounds of services (benefits) 
8 Ibid, as quoted in Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 221.
9 Ibid.
10 See, eg, Reuven S Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ (Spring, 1997) 
52 Tax Law Review 507, 520 (arguing that benefits such as these justify source-based corporate 
taxation in the sense that the source country’s government bears some of the costs that are 
necessary for earning the income and should therefore be compensated for incurring them).
11 Vogel–Part III, above n 3, 398 (observing that, ‘The only valid legitimation, therefore can be 
derived from benefit aspects. Usually it is the state of source that has provided most or all of the 
benefits relevant for production of the income.’).
12 Many of the views on the taxation of foreign income, as far as they are relevant today, can be 
traced back to Georg von Schanz: Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 218.
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provided, but Schanz has argued that the share of services provided by the source state 
is typically higher than that provided by the state of residence.13 
The reasoning of Schanz in reaching his views on the primacy of source-based 
taxation is essentially founded on benefit theory. In his view, residence is not a valid 
criterion for establishing tax liability nor is mere physical presence in a territory, 
because these criteria ‘lead to taxing people who get no benefit or who at best get only 
a partial benefit from a State’s activities.’14 From this base, Schanz argues that only one 
principle, ‘economic allegiance’, can result in a fair distribution of tax burdens and he 
expresses his views of this principle in terms of benefit theory: 
I want to emphasize that indeed there is no tax for which no benefit relation relates 
… after the circle of taxable persons has thus been determined … society may say: each 
person economically bound to me is taxed …15 (emphasis added).
Schanz then concludes that where a person is economically bound to his or her 
state of residence, and also to a source state through business activities (or by way of 
income arising in that other state), the allegiance to the source state is more important 
than that to the state of residence.
In considering the applicability of the benefit principle to justify source-based taxation 
in an electronic commerce context, a question that needs to be addressed is whether 
source countries should be limited to taxing the income of non-resident businesses 
only in situations where such businesses have a physical presence16 in the country of 
source. That is, in an electronic commerce context, the issue that needs to be analysed 
is whether the benefit theory is only compatible with having a physical presence in the 
country of source. This is important since electronic commerce affords businesses the 
facility to earn profits from interacting with source countries without requiring them 
to maintain a physical presence in the country of source.
In a traditional context, McLure argues that taxation based on the benefit principle 
suggests that a physical presence is probably needed to establish tax nexus for source-
based taxation.17 This is because many of the services described earlier (eg, police 
13 Ibid 219, Vogel– Part III, above n 3, 395 (noting that Schanz suggested that the source state 
should levy three-fourths of the tax that it would ordinarily levy on residents and the state of 
residence should levy one-fourth of the tax it ordinarily would levy on the domestic source 
income of non-residents, and further observing that it is a pity that Schanz’s proposed division of 
taxing rights between residence and source countries has almost never been put into practice).
14 Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 219 (arguing further that a burden would be imposed on people if these 
criteria were used to the advantage of those who would fully benefit from a State’s activities and 
in Schanz’s view this would be unfair).
15 Ibid (citing Schanz).
16 The term ‘physical presence’ is used intentionally here instead of the treaty concept of ‘permanent 
establishment’ to avoid addressing the issue of whether a permanent establishment is the proper 
test of physical presence. This is a matter that relates to the way source is defined which is outside 
the scope of this paper. For present purposes, the main issue is whether the principles that underlie 
source-based taxation (including benefit theory) are applicable in an electronic commerce context.
17 McLure, above n 5, 6:5.
447The TheoreTical foundaTions and conTinued raTionale for 
source-based TaxaTion in an elecTronic commerce environmenT
and fire protection) that benefit businesses which provide tangible goods and services 
would only be available and relevant in the case where such businesses maintain 
a physical presence in source countries. An important issue raised by electronic 
commerce is where income should be regarded as being generated, if all the value of 
what is sold is created in the residence country but the customers that determine that 
value are in the source country. In such cases, from an economic perspective, the only 
contribution of a source country would often only be its customer base or market. 
In this context, it could therefore be argued that source countries provide little or no 
benefits relevant to the production of income that would justify source-based taxation 
under the benefit principle.
This argument can, however, be challenged on two grounds. First, Skaar provides 
support for the view that even if a business does not have a physical presence in the 
source country it benefits substantially from its infrastructure and therefore should 
make a contribution to the source country, consistent with the benefit theory of 
taxation. According to him:
A [permanent establishment] is merely a piece of evidence of economic allegiance, 
not the reason for source-state taxation. The circumstance that short-term business 
operations may accumulate substantial profits from domestic sources indicates on the 
contrary that the taxpayer benefits substantially from the infrastructure of the host 
country, even though no [permanent establishment] exists. It seems that an enterprise 
which does not need to invest in immovable facilities, or other fixed places of business, 
may still derive considerable advantages from the community in which its income 
sources are located. Today, the performance of a business activity in another country, the 
duration of the activity and the profits arising from it, are per se significant arguments 
…[that] requires all enterprises which obtain such benefits from a country to render 
a corresponding contribution to this society, whether or not they have a [permanent 
establishment].18 (emphasis added).
Second, despite possible claims by non-resident businesses which have no physical 
presence in source countries that they therefore derive no benefits from these 
countries, it is argued that source jurisdictions do provide significant benefits to 
companies that carry on business activities with them, even in the absence of a 
physical presence. Apart from Skaar’s analysis noted earlier, non-resident companies 
that do not maintain a physical presence in source countries nevertheless benefit from 
the source country’s legal system inasmuch as they rely upon it to enforce payment 
for transactions, uphold intellectual property rights (eg, trademarks), and maintain 
a pro-competitive and conducive business environment. Indeed, the protection of 
intellectual property rights (eg, in the case of computer software) is critical to vendors 
of intangible products and digitised services and the protection of these rights arise 
independently of the need for any physical presence to be maintained in the source 
country. Likewise, vendors of digitised content (including music and computer 
18 Arvid A Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (1991) 559-60 (framing 
his concept of the benefit principle in what he refers to as the ‘equivalence principle’, which he 
argues requires all enterprises which obtain benefits from a country to render a corresponding 
contribution to that country, whether or not they have a physical presence in that country).
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games) would not have a market in source countries that did not have a suitable 
telecommunications infrastructure or whose population lacked competency in 
computers. The provision of these benefits therefore adds weight to the case for source-
based taxation under the benefit principle, even in the absence of a physical presence 
in a source country.19 Further, source countries would need to provide for the waste 
disposal for packaging materials, consumer protection laws and an infrastructure 
upon which delivery vehicles can travel (in the case of physically delivered electronic 
commerce products),20 and the provision of these benefits strengthens the case for the 
source-based taxation of electronic commerce transactions.
Therefore, in an electronic commerce context, as benefits would be provided to non-
resident vendors even though they may lack a physical presence in source countries, it 
is arguable that the costs of providing these benefits should justify the right for source 
countries to tax the resultant income (or at least part of it) under the benefit principle. 
In other words, it is arguable that the benefit principle continues to justify source-
based tax even in an electronic commerce context, where business may be conducted 
in source countries by non-resident vendors without the need for these vendors to 
maintain a physical presence in the source country.
B.	 Neutrality
Neutrality is a fundamental tax policy principle. Essentially, neutrality requires that 
economic processes should not be affected by external influences such as taxation. In 
this way, it is argued that ‘productivity will be the highest when income producing 
factors are distributed by [the] market mechanism without public interference.’21 
Therefore, neutrality essentially relates to the concept of efficiency and tax laws which 
do not interfere with factor distribution by market forces are normally regarded as 
being ‘neutral’.22
The principle of neutrality in an international context is normally considered within 
two dimensions of neutrality: capital export neutrality (‘CEN’) and capital import 
19 McLure, above n 5, 6:13 (n 28). India has recently released a report on electronic commerce, 
where it is asserted that value is not created only in the seller’s country, but also arises from 
demand in the buyer’s country: ‘The Committee is also unable to accept that value-addition 
takes place only where manufacturing or marketing is done and that the customer base does 
not create any value-addition. Customer base creates demand. Without demand, there will not 
be any value’: Ministry of Finance, Report of the High Powered Committee on E-Commerce and 
Taxation (2001), <http://www.laws4india.com/indiantaxlaws/notification/ecomcontent.asp> 
(‘Indian Electronic Commerce Report’), cited in David Hardesty, ‘India to Go Its Own Way?’ 
(13 February 2002), <http://www.ecommercetax.com/doc/021002.htm>.
20 Ibid 6:6 (observing that ‘mail order sales of tangible products may [likewise] place demands on 
public services’).
21 Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-evaluation of 
Arguments (Part II)’ (1988) 10 Intertax 310 (‘Vogel–Part II’).
22 Ibid (noting that tax laws will never be completely neutral, but as far as efficiency is desirable, a 
high degree of neutrality should nevertheless be sought).
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neutrality (‘CIN’). However, apart from this traditional distinction, the literature 
reveals a trend to extend the traditional analysis to explore the concept of inter-nation 
neutrality, especially when neutrality is considered in an international context. This 
development has been largely influenced by the writings of Vogel.23 For convenience, 
the ensuing analysis will be separately conducted under the headings of CEN/CIN and 
inter-nation neutrality, reflecting the way the subject has developed in the literature.
1. Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality
Richard Musgrave has been credited as being the first to distinguish between capital 
export and capital import neutrality.24 According to his definition, ‘export neutrality 
means that the investor should pay the same total (domestic plus foreign) tax, whether 
he receives a given investment income from foreign or from domestic sources … 
Import neutrality means that capital funds originating in various countries should 
compete at equal terms in the capital market of any country.’25 Vogel has observed 
that export neutrality consequently implies a system of worldwide taxation with a 
foreign tax credit, while import neutrality implies a system of exemption, that is, of 
source-based taxation.26
The issue then becomes one of whether capital export neutrality is to be preferred over 
capital import neutrality. Richard Musgrave was not certain whether capital export 
neutrality should be preferred over capital import neutrality when he suggested the 
distinction, though Vogel notes that since the distinction was originally made, Peggy 
Musgrave has argued for priority for capital export neutrality, as she maintained that 
inter-nation neutrality was an impossible goal, given the differences in national tax 
structures and rates as well as in the benefits provided.27 The rationale for Musgrave’s 
preference for capital export neutrality will be examined later when the arguments 
in favour of capital import neutrality are analysed. However, before these arguments 
are detailed, the case for capital export neutrality (which favours residence-based 
taxation) will first be discussed.
23 Ibid 313. See also, Klaus Vogel, Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmonization, and Tax 
Neutrality under European Community Law: An Institutional Approach (1994) 21.
24 Vogel–Part II, above n 21, 311.
25 Ibid (citing Richard Musgrave, ‘Criteria for Foreign Tax Credit’ in Taxation and Operations 
Abroad, Symposium (1960) 84-85).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. See also, Vogel, above n 23, 22 (n 32) and references cited therein.
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Preferences for capital export neutrality can be found in the literature relating to 
neutrality.28 If this preference is maintained,29 then it is arguable capital-export 
neutrality is best achieved by adopting a residence-based tax system. This is because 
such an approach seeks to tax all investors at their residence country rate, irrespective 
of where such income was earned. With countries adopting varying rates of tax, 
this approach arguably serves the goal of capital-export neutrality best as the tax 
applicable to international income would equal the tax on domestic income in the 
capital-exporting country and therefore export neutrality would result.
In terms of efficiency, McLure argues that if all nations implement a residence-
based tax system, it would lead to the allocation of the world’s capital to its most 
productive use.30 Conversely, source-based taxation, he argues, would lead to an 
inefficient allocation of economic resources as it ‘discourages investment in high-tax 
jurisdictions and encourages investment in low-tax jurisdictions.’31
Finally, though capital-export neutrality could be achieved under a source-based 
tax system through the use of a foreign tax credit, because many countries apply a 
restricted tax credit system,32 it would arguably only be practically achievable to the 
extent that foreign rates of tax were less than domestic rates. 
28 See, eg, Charles McLure Jr, ‘Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes 
as the International Norm’ (1992) 45 National Tax Journal 145, 146-7, 153 (n 13) (explaining that 
capital-export neutrality is necessary to achieve an efficient allocation of the world’s investments, 
while capital-import neutrality is necessary for an efficient allocation of savings, considered to be a 
less significant goal); Vogel–Part II, above n 21, 311 (observing that Peggy Musgrave has argued for a 
priority of capital export over capital import neutrality: ‘it is generally correct as well to conceive of a 
tax neutrality with respect to all investors of one country, so that tax considerations will not influence 
their decisions to invest at home or abroad. Such capital-export neutrality will ensure that each 
national supply of capital available at that tax level will be allocated internationally in its most efficient 
manner’). Vogel also refers to other commentators who have supported this view, including Richard 
Musgrave and Bernard Snoy, with Snoy stating that: ‘in a world where capital markets are perfect and 
where the financing of corporate investment projects is not subjected to internal funds constraint, tax 
neutrality towards capital import is clearly not a prerequisite for efficient allocation of resources’: Ibid 
(citing Bernard Snoy, Taxes on Direct Investment Income in the EEC, A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(1975) 37); Ibid (noting that further support for capital export neutrality can be found in Sato and 
Bird, ‘International aspects of the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders’ (1975) 22 IMF Staff 
Papers 408 (‘only capital-export neutrality accords with the objective of world efficiency’)).
29 It is has been argued that the capital-export neutrality versus the capital-import neutrality debate 
is less significant and relevant in a globalising economy: see, eg, Daniel J Frisch, ‘The Economics 
of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches’ (1990) 47 Tax Notes 581.
30 Charles E McLure Jr, ‘US Tax Laws and Capital Flight from Latin America’ (1989) 20 University 
of Miami Inter-American Law Review 321, 325.
31 Ibid.
32 Many countries, including the United States, operate a restricted foreign tax credit system. This 
is for many reasons, including the concern that to grant a full credit for taxes paid in other 
countries where foreign rates exceed domestic rates may operate as a subsidy arrangement for 
one country. However, by operating under a restricted foreign tax credit system, pure capital-
export neutrality cannot be achieved.
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In summary, the main argument in favour of capital export neutrality rests on the 
concept of worldwide economic efficiency – the belief that ‘only capital export 
neutrality comports with the goal of economic efficiency, i.e. of allocating production 
factors in such a way that productivity will be (Pareto-) optimal.’33
However, it is arguable that, to the non-economist generally and to businesses in 
particular, capital import neutrality is preferable as it relies on considerations of 
international competitiveness rather than theoretical economic efficiency. Further, 
from the perspective of a vendor that sells products in a foreign country, it might 
be considered more equitable to be taxed in that country at the same level as other 
competing businesses in the foreign country, particularly if the level of tax is lower in 
the foreign country than in the vendor’s home country. Considerations of international 
competitiveness may be especially important and relevant in an electronic commerce 
context given the increased mobility of business activity that electronic commerce 
offers. In this sense, inter-nation neutrality would require that a taxpayer who 
conducts business in another country, and thus utilises the other country’s facilities 
(public goods), should be taxed at no more than anyone else, who, under the same 
circumstances, uses these facilities to the same extent.34 In other words, if benefits are 
utilised by a non-resident business operator, then it is arguable that the non-resident 
operator should not be taxed at any more than anyone else who uses these facilities to 
the same extent and this outcome would be compatible with capital import neutrality 
and taxation in the country of source.
Apart from international competitiveness considerations suggesting taxation at source 
under the principle of capital import neutrality, the preference for capital export 
neutrality that has traditionally been evident in the literature has been challenged 
and, on the basis of these challenges (which suggest that capital import neutrality 
should prevail), it may be argued that source-based taxation should be preferred over 
residence-based taxation. It is therefore instructive to review these challenges.
Otto Gandenberger, in a 1983 paper, put forward three arguments, contrary to 
what has been argued in the literature, in favour of capital export neutrality.35 First, 
if a residence system of taxation is employed where the rate of tax in the residence 
country is higher than the source country, Gandenberger argued that a reduced after-
33 Vogel, above n 23, 22.
34 At the same time, one may question what benefits are utilised by a non-resident business operator 
in an electronic commerce context, and the specific issue of benefits was examined earlier and will 
be returned to when the concept of inter-nation neutrality is analysed later in this paper. For now, it 
may be briefly stated that a non-resident business operator in an electronic commerce environment 
would still utilise public goods and services in the source country, including the legal system (eg, 
to protect intellectual property including copyrights in software delivered digitally) as well as the 
transport infrastructure (eg, for products ordered on-line but delivered by conventional means).
35 Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 222 (citing Otto Gandenberger, ‘Kapitalexportneutralität versus 
Kapitalimportneutralität. Allokative Überlegungen zu einer Grundfrage der internationalen 
Besteuerung. Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftspolitik’ (1983) Nr. 7. Mainz: Forschungsinstitut für 
Wirtschaftspolitik.); Vogel, above n 23, 23. What follows on this point is adapted from these sources.
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tax profit would reduce the chance of an enterprise to finance new investment in the 
source country. This is because such an enterprise would have to anticipate a higher 
overall tax burden than its competitors in a lower taxed country (because of taxation 
in the residence country) and it therefore could be influenced in its decision (made 
in the residence country) whether to invest in the country of source. This outcome 
would be contrary to capital export neutrality being achieved. Second, Gandenberger 
argued that the level of taxation in any country is likely to correspond to the level of 
public goods provided, so that a country providing less public goods will often have a 
lower tax rate than one providing more public goods. If this is true and if the country 
of source has a lower tax rate than the residence country, an enterprise’s decision 
whether to invest in the lower taxed country could be affected since it would receive 
less public goods in the lower taxed country than the country of residence, yet it 
would be subjected to the higher residence country’s tax rate.36 Finally, Gandenberger 
shows that contrary to what has been written in favour of capital export neutrality, 
source state taxation is adopted by many countries, particularly in cases of deferral.37 
Based on these arguments, Gandenberger concluded that, contrary to prevailing 
economic theory, capital import neutrality should be preferred over capital export 
neutrality, implying taxation by source countries.
Other prominent economists, including Leif Mutén, have similarly argued in favour of 
the advantages of source state taxation and the disadvantages of a residence-based tax 
system, particularly in the case of developing countries.38 Norman Ture has advanced 
the arguments by trying to redefine neutrality as meaning ‘that the taxation does not 
alter the (explicit or implicit) relative prices of goods, services, activities, production 
inputs, and so forth, in the private sector.’39 According to him, this definition means 
that ‘neither country will attempt to use its fiscal powers to change relative prices 
in the other country, any more than it would in the absence of taxes.’40 From this, 
Ture argues that residence-based taxation distorts neutrality (as formulated by him), 
and therefore is inconsistent with economic efficiency. He further argues that only 
exclusive taxation by source countries and exemption by residence countries will 
36 In other words, an enterprise investing in a lower-taxed source country would be paying a 
premium to do so as it would receive less public goods in the country of source compared with 
those it would receive in its country of residence, yet it would still be subjected to a higher 
residence country rate of taxation.
37 Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 221 (pointing out that Latin America has traditionally emphasised 
source-based taxation in its income tax laws); Ibid 222 (further observing that the International 
Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution in 1955 to the effect that source countries should 
have the ‘sole right’ to tax international income. Vogel also gives the example of the International 
Fiscal Association, which in congresses held in 1961 and 1984, affirmed its support for source-
based taxation).
38 Leif Mutén, ‘Some Topical Issues Concerning International Double Taxation’ in Sijbren Cnossen 
(ed), Comparative Tax Studies. Essays in Honor of Richard Goode (1983). Thomas Horst and 
Sijbren Cnossen have likewise questioned the preference given to capital export neutrality, 
claiming, inter alia, that it restrains international investment: both cited in Vogel, above n 23, 24.
39 Vogel, above n 23, 24.
40 Ibid.
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yield a neutral outcome as it is only such a system that would leave the international 
flow of capital and commerce unaffected.
Hence, apart from international competitiveness considerations favouring capital 
import neutrality and therefore source-based taxation, from the economic perspective, 
a similar conclusion may be reached. Ture’s analysis, discussed above, shows that 
export neutrality can distort relative prices. This supports import neutrality, as do 
the arguments put forward by Gandenberger, who concludes that a residence-based 
system would be non-neutral and therefore inefficient. Others, including Barry 
Bracewell-Milnes and J D Foster have reached similar conclusions, strengthening 
the arguments in favour of capital import neutrality and therefore taxation based 
on source.41 Hence, if the distinction between export and import neutrality is to be 
maintained, it is argued that preference should be accorded to import rather than 
export neutrality, thereby favouring source-based taxation. Finally, for the reasons 
detailed earlier, including considerations of international competitiveness, it is further 
contended that this analysis would be equally (if not more) applicable in an electronic 
commerce context.
2. Inter-Nation Neutrality
The above analysis has assumed that the distinction between export and import 
neutrality will remain. However, it is timely to re-examine the distinction, particularly 
in an international context and support for this re-examination can be found in the 
literature.42 Vogel posits that in an international setting, the question to be raised to 
achieve neutrality is ‘what preliminary conditions must exist in each of the countries 
concerned to prevent the combined effect of their tax laws from favouring investment 
in one of these countries.’43 That is, Vogel suggests looking for a concept of neutrality 
between countries or inter-nation neutrality. 
Such an idea has been suggested previously by others including Norman Ture; 
however, Peggy Musgrave and others considered it impossible to formulate a concept 
of inter-nation neutrality because of their belief that the differing structures and levels 
of taxation that countries maintained created an inherently non-neutral position that 
presented an insurmountable obstacle to any notion of inter-nation neutrality.44 Ture 
41 Both cited in Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 222 (noting that Foster’s analysis supported Ture’s 
arguments that residence-based taxation distorts relative prices, while Bracewell-Milnes 
compared the effect of international trade to the prohibitive consequences of customs duties and 
described such systems to be ‘fiscal imperialism’).
42 See, eg, Frisch, above n 29, 581 (arguing that the distinction between import and export 
neutrality may be less relevant in a globalising economy); McLure Jr, above n 5, 6:12 (n 21) 
(observing that capital export and capital import neutrality are mutually compatible only if tax 
rates (and the definition of income) are identical in source and residence countries).
43 Vogel–Part II, above n 21, 313.
44 Ibid 311 (noting that Peggy Musgrave discarded the idea of an ‘international fiscal neutrality’ 
because she argued that it is virtually impossible to attain, given the differences in national tax 
structures and rates as well as the benefits provided.).
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sought to overcome Musgrave’s reservations by arguing that neutrality should be 
framed in terms of its effect on relative prices – that is, that taxation should not alter 
the relative prices of goods and services.45 Viewed in this way, inter-nation neutrality 
is sustainable and means that ‘neither country will attempt to use its fiscal powers to 
change relative prices in the other country, any more than it would in the absence of 
taxes.’46 Ture then rejects worldwide taxation and argues for source-based taxation, 
contending that this would be consistent with inter-nation neutrality.
Vogel puts forward a similar argument, but for different reasons. Vogel suggests that 
the concept of inter-nation neutrality is feasible if one considers not just taxes but 
extends the analysis to include other burdens, such as transaction costs, as well as 
benefits, since to an investor these additional considerations are as important as the 
level of taxation between countries.47 Vogel’s rationale relates back to the concept of 
efficiency which underlies the concept of neutrality. As mentioned earlier, efficiency is 
achieved if economic processes are unimpaired by state influences. Vogel argues that 
these influences should not only include taxes, but should include other burdens (eg, 
transaction costs) and benefits and such an argument has much merit. For example, 
under Vogel’s theory, if taxes between two countries are equal but the benefits in the 
second country are greater, than other things being equal, it can be expected that 
an investor will choose the second country in preference to the first. Conversely, if 
benefits in two countries are identical, but taxes and transaction costs are lower in the 
first country, then one can expect an investor to prefer this country. 
Vogel therefore argues that the reference base for establishing neutrality should not 
be taxes in isolation but the total state influence, which includes taxes, transaction 
costs and benefits. At the same time, as the relation of benefits and burdens between 
countries will not be the same, Vogel creates a concept that he calls ‘administrative net 
output’ which represents the surplus of the total value of state-provided benefits and 
services over state burdens (including taxes and transaction costs). He then argues 
that all things being equal, there will be a tendency to invest in countries where the 
administrative net output is advantageous to the investor and concludes that only 
source-based taxation can comport with the principle of inter-nation neutrality:
Inter-nations neutrality then means than this relation must not be altered to the 
disadvantage of persons investing in foreign countries. In other words, inter-nations 
neutrality requires that a taxpayer who conducts an enterprise in another country–or 
market–and thus utilizes the other country’s facilities (public goods) can be sure of being 
taxed no more than anyone else who, under the same circumstances, uses these facilities to 
the same extent. This can be achieved only by restricting each country to taxing income 
from domestic sources. Worldwide taxation is inconsistent with this neutrality principle.48
45 Norman Ture, ‘Taxing Foreign Source Income’, in US Taxation of American Business Abroad 
(1975) 38, cited in Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 222.
46 Ibid 39.
47 Vogel, above n 23, 25 (‘a complete analysis should consider not only taxes, or more broadly 
state-imposed burdens, but also state-provided benefits, because those are their counterparts 
that cannot be isolated from such burdens and which are of similar importance to the investor’).
48 Vogel–Part II, above n 21, 314.
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In considering the applicability of Vogel’s conclusions in favour of source-based 
taxation in an electronic commerce environment, it is relevant to examine the nature 
of the benefits and transaction costs that are central to his reasoning for inter-nation 
neutrality. In a traditional context, the benefits to be taken into account in determining 
inter-nation neutrality could include security, economic stability, infrastructures and 
direct subsidies, as well as the level of public health, of public education (which impacts 
on the supply and quality of labour) and information.49 These benefits would be no-
less relevant in an electronic commerce setting, and indeed some benefits, such as 
protection to be afforded to intellectual property rights, as well as those flowing from 
secure financial systems may assume greater importance than in a traditional context. 
In terms of transaction costs, Matthews observes that they consist of ‘the cost of 
arranging a contract ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post, as opposed 
to production costs, which are the costs of executing a contract.’50 Vogel suggests 
that transaction costs are determined by the total legal environment of an enterprise 
and should include not only costs that relate to a contract (or product), but extend 
to general costs of transactions that are incurred by a business including the cost 
of information, as well as costs of legal protection, public security, efficiency of 
administrative agencies and services provided by them as well as costs associated 
with a stable business and monetary environment.51 Again, many of these transaction 
costs, including especially legal costs, information costs and a stable business and 
monetary environment, would be equally applicable in an electronic commerce 
context and hence the ensuing analysis should also be applicable to electronic 
commerce transactions.
If transaction costs are taken into account in determining economic efficiency, it can 
be argued that capital export neutrality (which supports residence-based taxation) 
is an unattainable ideal since a residence country cannot ensure that investments, 
wherever made by its residents, are subject to the same transaction costs in foreign 
countries where such investments are made.52 By contrast, capital import neutrality 
(which supports source-based taxation) would be attainable as foreigners would be 
subjected to the same transaction and production costs in the country of source 
as would apply to local enterprises and if no additional burdens were imposed by 
the residence country on the foreign investor, then competition between local and 
foreign enterprises in the state of source would be equal, unobstructed and therefore 
neutral.53 Therefore, in light of the preceding analysis, it can be argued that source-
49 Ibid 313. See also, the discussion of benefits under the ‘Benefit Theory’ heading earlier in this 
paper.
50 R C O Matthews, ‘The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth’ (1990) 96 Economic 
Journal 903, cited in Vogel, above n 23, 26 (n 44).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid 27 (‘[The residence] state has no influence whatsoever on transaction costs and on other 
state-induced costs incurred by the foreign investment’). 
53 Vogel notes, however, that in order for a source-tax system to be truly neutral, it is not taxation 
alone but the aggregate of state-induced costs and benefits which must fall on investments by 
residents and foreigners equally: Ibid 28.
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based taxation of international electronic commerce transactions can also be justified 
under the principles of tax neutrality.
C.	 Equity
Apart from considerations of neutrality, equity is another fundamental tax policy 
principle. In a tax context, equity considerations which refer to the position of 
individual taxpayers (individual or taxpayer equity) are normally distinguished from 
those which refer to the gain and loss of the country of residence and the country 
of source (inter-nation equity), and Vogel credits Peggy Musgrave for being the 
first person to make this distinction.54 The analysis which follows will be conducted 
separately under the headings of individual and inter-nation equity, consistent with 
this distinction.
1. Individual Equity
Musgrave rationalises individual equity on the basis of equality, arguing that ‘all 
residents of a certain country who enjoy the protection and other privileges provided 
by the government of that country … should be taxed by that country at rates equal 
for all those receiving equal income from whatever source, be it domestic or foreign.’55 
Normally, individual equity is considered in terms of horizontal equity (similarly 
positioned taxpayers should be taxed similarly) and vertical equity (taxpayers who 
have higher incomes should pay a correspondingly higher amount of tax). 
Doernberg et al suggest that considerations of individual equity support both source 
and residence-based taxation. In relation to source-based taxation, they suggest that 
the principle of individual equity justifies source country taxation of domestic source 
income derived by non-residents.56 They also argue that the principle of individual 
equity justifies residence-based taxation of worldwide income earned by residents. 
This is on the basis of accepting the argument that taxpayers that earn domestic 
income should pay the same amount of tax as a similarly situated taxpayer who earns 
the same amount of income from foreign sources.
Vogel, however, puts forward a contrary view, contending that considerations of 
individual equity favour only source-based taxation, on the basis that ‘world-wide 
taxation by the country of residence may be unjust to the taxpayer who has earned 
his income in other countries, possibly under adverse conditions, and [further] that 
residence country taxation is unjust to the source country because it disrupts the source 
54 Vogel–Part III, above n 3, 394.
55 Ibid, citing Peggy Richman (now Musgrave), Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An 
Economic Analysis (1963) 11.
56 Doernberg et al, Electronic Commerce and Multijurisdictional Taxation (2001) 69 (‘For example, 
under this principle, a resident of Country R [the residence country] and a non-resident earning 
the same amount of profit from the same type of business activities in Country R should be taxed 
the same’).
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country’s tax policy decisions.’57 More specifically, Vogel makes his case on the grounds 
of legitimation, equality, integrity and redistribution, which he contends, supports 
exclusive taxation of foreign direct investment income in the country of source.58 
These arguments will be briefly summarised as they are germane to establishing to the 
rationale for source-based taxation on the grounds of individual equity. 
In terms of legitimation, Vogel claims that a tax claim can only be considered equitable 
if the transaction or event, by the state in question, is legitimate–that is, can be 
justified. He then uses benefit theory59 to support his conclusion that source-country 
taxation is to be preferred on the grounds of legitimation. While legitimation looks 
to the relationship between a taxpayer and a state, equality looks to the relationship 
of taxpayers toward each other, and Vogel argues that taxpayers who receive foreign 
income must be compared not only to similarly situated taxpayers in their country 
of residence, but to competitors in the source country. Extending the analysis, if tax 
rates are lower in the country of source than in the residence country, then taxation in 
the country of residence at its higher rate would be contrary to achieving equality in 
the source country, even in the case where the residence country credits foreign taxes. 
In addition, even if a case can be made on the grounds of equality for taxing foreign 
income at the same rates as domestic income, it can only be regarded as a convincing 
conclusion with regard to that part of foreign income that has been repatriated to the 
residence country. This is because ‘[v]ery often foreign income will be reinvested in 
the enterprise in the source state; it may even be difficult to withdraw it. In such cases 
the recipient of foreign income is in quite a different situation than the recipient of a 
comparable amount of domestic income.’60 Therefore, equality considerations would 
only be fully consistent with a limited worldwide taxation with a credit–limited to 
remitted income; they are not consistent with the taxation of unremitted income for 
the reasons provided above.
Apart from legitimation and equality that are most relevant to considerations of 
individual equity, Vogel puts forward considerations of integrity and redistribution to 
strengthen his arguments for source-based taxation on individual equity grounds.61 
It is contended that the preceding arguments which support source-based taxation 
on the grounds of individual equity considerations would be no less relevant in an 
electronic commerce context. Further, in an electronic commerce context, tax equity 
may also mean that taxpayers that are engaged in traditional commerce should be 
treated the same as those who engage in electronic commerce, although this could be 
a consideration that also relates to tax neutrality.
57 Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 222 (referring to the German legal experts Hans Flick, Klaus Tipke, 
Arno Schulze-Brachmann and Horst-Walter Endriss, all of whom have defended this view).
58 Vogel–Part III, above n 3, 394. What follows on this point is adapted from this source.
59 The benefit theory has been detailed earlier in this paper and accordingly will not be repeated 
here.
60 Vogel–Part III, above n 3, 396.
61 Ibid 397. Arguments based on integrity and redistribution are not detailed here as they are not 
considered central to the present discussion.
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2. Inter-Nation Equity
Apart from individual equity, in an international context, inter-nation equity needs to 
be considered. Under the principle of inter-nation equity, each country should receive 
an equitable share of tax revenues from cross-border transactions.62 An equitable 
division of tax revenue depends on (a) the allocation of the tax base between the 
source and residence country, and (b) the tax rate in the source country.63
Vogel argues that inter-nation equity tends to strongly favour taxation by the country 
of source.64 This is because traditionally it is the country of source that has provided 
most or all of the benefits relevant for production and without the source country’s 
economic opportunities (ie, market) the income would normally not have been 
generated. At the same time, however, Vogel accepts that a certain integration of the 
seller’s activities into the economy of the source country is necessary before source 
country taxing rights arise.65 This has traditionally been evidenced by the existence 
of a permanent establishment, or satisfaction of the ‘trading within’ concept for 
common law countries. As electronic commerce allows vendors to sell products to 
consumers in source countries without such integration or physical presence in the 
source country, it therefore calls into question the taxing right of a source country 
over income which arises from electronic commerce transactions. However, even if 
such integration has not occurred, Vogel argues that taxation by the source state must 
be considered under the principle of inter-nation equity:
It cannot convincingly be denied that providing a market contributes to the sale income 
at least to some extent as providing the goods does. There is no valid objection, therefore, 
against a claim of the sales state to tax part of the sales income.66
This line of reasoning therefore supports the continued taxation in source countries of 
income that arises from international electronic commerce transactions. Indeed, over 
time, countries have asserted their right to tax income received from sales to their 
residents, reasoning that this income would not have been earned but for the market 
that they provide. An argument of this nature would seem to be especially strong in 
cases where customised or made-to-order products are involved, for such products 
would simply not be made without the market provided. Similar considerations 
would therefore seem to be applicable and relevant in an electronic commerce 
context, thereby suggesting the continued application of source-based taxation under 
the principle of inter-nation equity. Finally, it is relevant to note that the OECD has 
expressly accepted that one of the tax framework conditions that should govern the 
taxation of electronic commerce transactions includes the principle of inter-nation 
equity:
62 Nancy H Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of International Income’ (1998) 29 Law and Policy 
in International Business 145.
63 Peggy Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income (1969), Chapter VII, cited 
in Doernberg et al, above n 56, 69.
64 Vogel–Part III, above n 3, 398.
65 Ibid 401.
66 Ibid. See also, Indian Electronic Commerce Report, above n 19.
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… [A]ny adaptation of existing international taxation principles should be structured … 
to achieve a fair sharing of the tax base from electronic commerce between countries …67 
D.	 Entitlement
Another rationale for source-based taxation is based on the concept of ‘entitlement’–
the view that the source country is entitled to tax income that arises within its 
geographic borders, even if that income accrues to non-resident taxpayers. The 
entitlement view of taxation is usually associated with Peggy Musgrave who contends 
that the source country should be entitled to tax income originating within its borders 
because it is the source country as the ‘place of income-generating activity’68 rather 
than the country where the income-producer resides (ie, the residence country) 
that economically contributes to the production of income and therefore the source 
country should be compensated for its contribution. Musgrave further argues that 
according to entitlement theory, source countries should be entitled to tax income 
originating within their borders, since the countries where consumers reside provide 
services that are complementary to the consumption of their residents.69
Apart from these reasons, the right of source countries to tax income based on the 
entitlement view of taxation may be rationalised on several possible grounds. One 
is source-country taxation under a benefit rule; 70 another consists of a system of 
economic rents; and finally, taxation at source based on entitlement may be viewed 
as a fundamental right of source countries. Under a benefit view, it can be argued 
that source countries should be able to ‘share in the gains of foreign-owned factors 
of production operating within its borders; gains which are generated in cooperation 
with its own factors, whether they be natural resources, an educated and/or low-cost 
workforce, or the proximity of a market.’71 Other benefits that may be provided by 
source countries could include transportation facilities and infrastructure, which 
taken together with a company’s own capital, would generate profits that the source 
67 OECD, ‘Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions’ in OECD, Taxation and 
Electronic Commerce: Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions (2001), Annex 
1, 228 (‘OECD Taxation Framework Conditions’).
68 Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, ‘Inter-Nation Equity’ in Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays 
in Honor of Carl S Shoup (1972) 71, cited in Richard Doernberg and Luc Hinnekens, Electronic 
Commerce and International Taxation (1999) 306 (n 641).
69 Peggy B Musgrave, ‘Interjurisdictional Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income’ in Sijbren 
Cnossen (ed), Tax Coordination in the European Community (1987) 198; Peggy B Musgrave, 
‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’ in Charles E McLure Jr (ed), The State 
Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 230.
70 It is useful at this point to note the difference between the benefit and entitlement theories. 
Benefit theory looks to the benefits of services provided to business by the government of a 
taxing country. However, the entitlement theory is based on economic benefits (eg, the benefits 
of exploiting a market), rather than public services which are more or less irrelevant under this 
theory: McLure, above n 5, 6:4.
71 Peggy B Musgrave, ‘Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation’ (2001) 
26(4) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1335.
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country should be entitled to tax under a strict benefit rule.72 In this sense, the tax 
revenues collected by source countries may be viewed as an economic rent for the 
leasing of complementary factors of production to non-residents, or alternatively, may 
be viewed as a ‘quid pro quo payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing services 
provided by the host country.’73 (italics added).
Apart from a benefit view of entitlement, Kaufman suggests that another possibility is 
that under a system of economic rents, the source country could charge an economic 
rent on that part of a taxpayer’s income which exceeds the amount of income the 
taxpayer would have earned on a domestic investment.74 This view is especially 
persuasive in the case of taxes involving natural resources, particularly where such 
resources are privately owned and their exploitation results in economic rents where 
profits generated may be considered extraordinary in the sense of exceeding the 
normal rate of return on capital.75 Apart from examples such as this, McLure suggests 
that the entitlement theory may be equally applicable in industries where profits are 
extraordinary for other reasons, as when there is significant market power.76
The final possible rationale for the principle of entitlement is the legal principle of 
territoriality in international law under which the source country has the competence 
to tax income resulting from activities occurring within its borders.77 In this regard, 
Musgrave observes that the right of a jurisdiction to tax all income arising within 
its geographical borders is a fundamental entitlement that is reflected in most 
international tax treaties.78
In considering whether the principle of entitlement justifies the taxation of income 
from electronic commerce transactions in source countries, the issue of whether the 
entitlement principle allows for source-country taxation in the absence of a physical 
presence needs to be addressed, as electronic commerce allows for the possibility 
for business profits to be derived from source countries without the need for any 
physical presence to be maintained in these countries. The literature shows that the 
entitlement theory does support taxation in source countries even in the case of 
businesses that lack a physical presence in those countries if entitlement is based on 
72 Kaufman, above n 62, 191 (‘A strict benefit rule would allow the host [source] country to impose 
a direct charge for the intermediate goods that the host country furnishes to the production 
process.’).
73 Musgrave, above n 71, 1335.
74 Kaufman, above n 62, 191.
75 McLure, above n 5, 6:4 (Further suggesting that words such as ‘heritage’ and ‘patrimony’ are 
commonly used to justify the taxation on natural resources).
76 Ibid (citing the example of extraordinary profits and the right to tax them in the case of a 
company like Coca-Cola, but not in the case of commodities such as wheat).
77 Kaufman, above n 62, 192 (adding that ‘[t]he legal principle of territoriality, however, does 
not suggest the measure of the host country’s entitlement’ and proceeding to suggest that ‘[a] 
tempering of the territoriality principle might be found in the principle of non-discrimination, 
the principle that all activity occurring within the host country’s borders should be taxed alike’).
78 Musgrave, above n 71, 1335.
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economic presence, rather than physical presence.79 Given that physical presence can 
be largely insignificant for an electronic commerce transaction, economic presence 
may be a better indicator upon which source-country tax nexus may be based and 
there is a body of supporting literature for this proposition.80 Economic presence in 
an electronic commerce context could be determined by reference to a regular and 
systematic direction of activities in a country. Determining whether activities amount 
to taxable nexus under this approach might depend on whether the activities of 
non-resident vendors were ‘purposefully directed’ at source-country customers, and 
according to Harris, this could be determined by asking the following three questions:
Did the taxpayer ‘purposefully avail’ itself of the benefits of a taxing state? Did the 
taxpayer’s conduct and operations in the taxing State rise to a level where it should have 
reasonably anticipated being haled into court? Were the taxpayer’s in-state activities a 
continuous and systematic part of its general business in the state?81
These considerations draw from the experience with the level and nature of the 
connections providing the nexus necessary to authorise a state’s authority to tax 
out-of-state mail order firms under the US state sales and use taxes and local income 
taxes and this experience may be useful if source-country entitlement is based on 
economic presence. 
Proceeding with the analysis based on a business having an economic presence in an 
electronic commerce environment, McLure observes that since company taxes are 
usually based on accounting profits rather than economic profits (which includes 
the normal return to capital), it can therefore be argued that entitlement to tax a 
company’s profits should exist any time such a company avails itself of the productive 
resources or the market of a country–that is, if it has an economic presence in the 
country.82 Therefore, if entitlement is based on economic presence, the case for the 
79 See, eg, McLure, above n 5, 6:6 (supporting the proposition that the entitlement theory is 
conducive to taxation of corporations that lack a physical presence).
80 See, eg, Avi-Yonah, above n 10, 507 (advocating a change from physical presence to a gross 
income threshold for the purposes of determining source-tax nexus); Michael Lambooij, 
‘Rethinking Corporate Residence (Speech)’, 6 June 1997, <http://www.lovotax.nl/lovotax/tax/
document.html?doc_id=175>; Ernst & Young LLP, ‘Logging on to Cyberspace Tax Policy: An 
Interactive Services Association Task Force White Paper’ (1997) Internet Services Association, 
<http://www.isa.net/about/releases/taxwhpap.html>; Steven J Forte, ‘A Cyberspace Perspective: 
Use Tax Collection on Internet Purchases: Should the Mail Order Industry Serve as a Model?’ 
(1997) John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 203 (suggesting economic 
presence replace physical presence for determining tax nexus).
81 As quoted in Luc Hinnekens, ‘Looking for an Appropriate Jurisdictional Framework for Source-
State Taxation of International Electronic Commerce in the Twenty-first Century’ (1998) 
Intertax 26(6-7) 192, 198.
82 McLure, above n 5, 6:4.
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taxation of remote vendors (even in the absence of a physical presence in source 
countries) would seem strong.83 
In summary, the line of reasoning based on the entitlement theory and economic 
presence supports the taxation at source of income that arises from international 
electronic commerce transactions. At the same time, an important qualification to 
the argument presented is that economic presence would need to be significant before 
a business should be subject to tax in a source country.84 There are many ways this 
could be achieved in an electronic commerce scenario. For example, liability for 
income tax could be made subject to a de minimis threshold test to avoid innumerable 
cases of limited liability in which only a little income is generated. For present 
purposes, the point being made is that source country taxation of profits that arise 
from international electronic commerce transactions can be justified pursuant to 
the entitlement theory – the mechanics of how source may need to be (re)defined to 
accommodate the characteristics of electronic commerce is a secondary consideration 
to theoretically establishing the proposition for the continuation of source-based 
taxation in an electronic commerce context.
E.	 Pragmatic	Considerations,	the	Prospect	of	Double	Taxation	and	
Impediments	to	International	Trade
The final rationale for source-based taxation is pragmatic: a source country is unlikely 
to forgo taxing income that arises within its boundaries. In his writings on the work 
of the League of Nations, Mitchell Carroll observed that taxation based on the 
source principle is widely applied, reflecting the desire of governments (particularly 
in developing countries) to tax foreigners.85 Thomas S Adams, has expressed the 
pragmatic considerations underlying a source-country’s right to tax in these words: 
‘Every state insists upon taxing the non-resident alien who derives income from 
83 Ibid (adding that this argument would be valid whether such a vendor was selling tangible 
products delivered by traditional means, or intangible products or services provided over the 
Internet).
84 This qualification is grounded as much in common sense as it is in principle as it would not be 
sensible, both on administrative and compliance cost grounds, for source countries to levy an 
income tax on all vendors that have an economic presence, no matter how small their scale of 
activities were.
85 Mitchell B Carroll, Prevention of International Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion (1939) 17 
(‘Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner, or in other words … taxes based 
on the idea of origin are … still very widely applied…’). See also, David L Forst, ‘The Continuing 
Vitality of Source-Based Taxation in the Electronic Age’ (1997) 15 Tax Notes International 
1455 (citing the League of Nations: ‘A survey of the whole field of recent taxation show how 
completely the Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner. It seems to be 
clearly instinctive that in laying down general principles to treat “origin” as of first importance 
and “residence” as of secondary importance’).
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source [sic] within that country, and rightly so, at least inevitably so.’86 Vogel has 
expressed similar sentiments, observing that ‘no country which levies an income tax 
(and very few do not fall into this category today) forgoes taxing domestic source 
income, irrespective of who has derived it.’87 Apart from these statements, as a 
practical matter, since source countries typically have the first opportunity to collect 
taxes on payments derived from within its borders, it is difficult to prevent these 
countries from taxing these payments. Thus, even if other bases for taxation may be 
preferred on economic or theoretical grounds, they are unlikely to be followed in 
practice, especially in the case of business income that is derived from large markets, 
where there may be little fear that the non-resident business will abandon the market 
because of the imposition of taxation by the source jurisdiction.88 Also, in these cases, 
the presence of substantial assets and/or intermediaries such as agents that act on 
behalf of non-resident businesses has made source taxation enforceable.
In an electronic commerce environment, it can be expected that source countries will 
also seek to tax payments arising from transactions arising within their borders. By 
the same token, the application of source-based taxation in an electronic commerce 
environment may be more difficult than in a traditional setting due to the reduced 
need for intermediaries, as well as by virtue of the fact that businesses do not need to 
maintain substantial physical presences (and therefore assets) in customer markets. 
However, these matters go to expedience or administrative considerations rather 
than being based on policy or principle. Therefore, while these factors may make the 
practical enforcement of source taxation difficult, it is argued that source countries 
will nevertheless persist with trying to tax these transactions, perhaps by using 
intermediaries, such as payment providers or Internet Service Providers, as their 
collection agents. 
The literature supports the proposition that source countries will seek to continue 
taxing income that arises from electronic commerce transactions on pragmatic 
grounds. For example, Doernberg et al have expressed the situation as follows:
The growth of electronic commerce may signal an economic realignment of the role of 
source and resident countries compared with their roles in traditional commerce … To 
the extent that electronic commerce replaces traditional commercial patterns, the tax 
balance between countries may be threatened … Any change in the balance of taxing 
authority between country R [the residence country] and country S [the source country] 
under existing international tax principles may lead countries–particularly those likely 
to be source countries (i.e., country S)–to call for new international tax principles or at 
86 Avi-Yonah, above n 10, 521 (citing Graetz and O’Hear, above n 6, 1037 (n 46) (quoting Thomas 
S Adams, ‘Interstate and International Double Taxation’ (1929) 22 National Tax Association Proc 
193, 197)).
87 Vogel–Part I, above n 7, 217.
88 Ibid (observing at the same time that in respect of portfolio investment, ‘even large source 
countries like the United States have tended to abandon it for fear of driving away mobile 
capital’. This may suggest that business income is a better candidate for source-based taxation 
than portfolio income).
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least for a reinterpretation of existing tax principles in a manner that will restore the 
preexisting tax equilibrium.89
Therefore, the political and practical reality is likely to be that source countries will 
not readily agree to see a part of their tax base disappear and therefore to the extent 
that such countries perceive they are not properly being able to participate in the 
tax base generated by electronic commerce, they may resort to creative, unilateral 
measures to attempt to tax some of these payments. If this occurs, it could conceivably 
lead to double tax and could thereby constitute an impediment to international 
trade. Such a result would also be in contravention of the OECD’s tax framework 
conditions that were agreed to at the Ottawa conference in 1998 which provides that 
‘any arrangements for applying international tax principles should be structured … to 
avoid double taxation and unintentional non taxation.’90
Despite the literature arguably supporting the proposition that source-based taxation 
of international electronic commerce taxations can be justified on pragmatic grounds, 
some may question whether the prospect of countries enacting unilateral measures 
constitutes a serious possibility. The response to this is that the prospect has already 
eventuated, in a decision involving the treaty between India and the United States and 
issued by India’s Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’).91
Under this decision, which involved the case of American Express travel-related 
services, India’s AAR asserted that foreign companies engaged in the credit card 
and traveller’s cheque business that received payments from an Indian company for 
gaining access to the foreign corporation’s computer system/central processing unit 
in the US earned royalty income which was taxable in India under the applicable 
treaty between India and the US. The essence of this case turned on the proper 
characterisation of payments made to access a computer database and hardware in 
another country (the US) from another (India). The AAR concluded that the payment 
was for the ‘right to use’ software and therefore constituted a royalty under Article 12 
of the applicable treaty.
The converse argument was that the payment was for services rendered, thereby 
giving rise to business profits rather than royalty income, which would only be 
taxed in the US in the absence of a permanent establishment in India.92 Under this 
view, the characterisation of what was acquired would be regarded as the ‘output’ of 
89 Doernberg et al, above n 56, 342-3.
90 OECD Taxation Framework Conditions, above n 67, Annex 1, 228.
91 P No 30 of 1999 (238 ITR 296). This decision has been discussed in several sources, including, 
eg, Indian Electronic Commerce Report, above n 19, 228; ‘Indian AAR Issues Landmark Ruling 
on E-Commerce Taxation under US-India Tax Treaty’ (1999) Tax Notes International 11-
14; Richard L Doernberg, ‘International Tax Issues: The Taxation of Business Profits’ (Paper 
presented at the International Fiscal Association Asia Regional Conference on E-Commerce and 
International Taxation, Mumbai, India, November 2000) 8.
92 The OECD MC dealt with independent personal services income separately in Article 14, 
however, this Article was deleted from the OECD MC on 29 April 2000, on the basis of an 
OECD report entitled Issues Related to Article 14 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This report 
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processed data rather than any ‘rights’ in the processing of the data. Paragraph 14 of 
the Commentary to Article 12 of the OECD MC supports this argument as the Indian 
company that accessed the US database acquired no rights in the software itself; 
rather it merely paid for the processing of the data that it sent to the US computer. 
Moreover, the OECD Final Treaty Characterisation Report93 supports the view that 
the payments in this example should be characterised as business profits rather than 
royalties.94
The ultimate result of this decision is that it could lead to double tax if one country 
(the United States in the case) treats the payment as being for services while another 
country (India in the example) regards the payment as being royalty income and 
subjects it to withholding tax. Further, if the US does not recognise the taxing 
authority of India, it may be unwilling to relieve double taxation by granting a tax 
credit for any withholding tax imposed by India, and in any event, even if a credit was 
permitted, it could be limited by the US.
This decision is also significant in the context of whether source countries should be 
able to tax electronic commerce transactions, as it may indicate a concern of countries 
like India if they perceive that they are not properly sharing in the tax base arising 
from electronic commerce, they will not be bound to OECD principles but rather will 
resort to unilateral and creative measures to attempt to tax some of these payments, 
notwithstanding that such measures may not conform to existing principles of 
international income allocation as contained in the OECD MC. And while it may be 
too early to tell which countries will be winners and which will be losers in electronic 
commerce, or even which countries will be source or residence countries, or net 
exporters or importers of capital, the perceptions that countries maintain of their 
relative positions cannot be ignored in the meantime.95
Outcomes such as those made possible by this decision are undesirable, not only 
because of the double tax possibilities that may arise from it, but also the impediments 
to international trade that could result because of it. These are both strong reasons, 
therefore, to allow source countries to share in the revenues which are generated from 
was adopted by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 January 2000. The effect of the deletion of 
Article 14 is that income derived from professional services or other activities of an independent 
character is now dealt with under Article 7 of the OECD MC as business profits. 
93 OECD, TAG on Treaty Characterisation of Electronic Commerce Payments, Tax Treaty 
Characterisation Issues Arising from E-Commerce (1 February 2001), < http://www.oecd.org/daf/
fa/e_com/ec_2_TREATY_CHAR_Eng.pdf> (‘OECD Final Treaty Characterisation Report’). 
94 Ibid. Categories 9-10 of the OECD Final Treaty Characterisation Report illustrate that payments 
made to an application service provider (the US company in the case) for access to software hosted 
on the provider’s computer should be classified as business profits and not royalties. Also, Categories 
15-16 of the report treat payments for data retrieval as business profits rather than royalties.
95 Doernberg, above n 91, 9 (‘To the extent that countries perceive that they are not sharing in the 
electronic commerce bounty, they may through creative, self-help attempt to tax some of the 
base-eroding payments’).
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electronic commerce transactions, even though this basis of taxation may be founded in 
pragmatic considerations rather than being underpinned by pure theoretical reasons.
II Conclusions
This paper has examined the fundamental tax policy principles that underlie source-
based taxation. These principles include benefit theory, neutrality considerations (eg, 
capital-import neutrality), principles of equity (eg, inter-nation equity), the concept 
of entitlement, and finally pragmatic considerations, including the prospect of double 
taxation and likely impediments to international trade. After analysing the basis for 
each of these principles and how they justify source-based taxation in a traditional 
context, it has been argued that they remain applicable in an electronic commerce 
environment, thereby establishing that source-based taxation of electronic commerce 
transactions is theoretically justifiable. It therefore follows that source-based taxation 
should continue to apply in an electronic commerce context.
